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Abstract 
Intergovernmental problems are increasingly dealt with in policy networks. This 
paper explores how network management helps to innovate intergovernmental 
relations. The innovative potential is studied by analysing different network 
management strategies, identifying network managers and their main attributes, 
and defining a number of management roles, using two case studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note 
This text is based on research conducted within the frame of the Policy Research 
Centre on Governmental organization in Flanders (SBOV II - 2007-2011), funded by 
the Flemish government. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and 
not those of the Flemish government.
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Introduction 
Complexity of public policy-making and interdependencies between the public and 
private sector stimulate collaboration through policy networks1; the latter are said 
to become increasingly important for government (Teisman and Klijn 2002). Policy 
networks are based on resource dependencies between (semi-)autonomous actors, 
and driven by trust (Scharpf 1997). Policy networks do not develop spontaneously; 
they need to be triggered (March and Simon 1958) and managed actively (Huxham 
and Vangen 2005).  
Policy networks are extensively studied, but their capacity in solving 
intergovernmental problems is not (Agranoff 2004). Intergovernmental networks 
are a specific type of policy networks, because the actors involved are different 
governments (as opposed to different governmental units only). As such, the 
distinctive character of intergovernmental networks is that they involve “boundary 
spanning activities of distinctive units that possess territory, identity and ascribed 
powers” (Agranoff 2008:1). So in IGR-networks, actors bring jurisdiction, position, 
and related resources to the table. In multi-level intergovernmental networks, 
there are also (semi-)hierarchic relations present based on the former, e.g. 
principal-agent relations between central and local government (i.e. an 
intergovernmental ‘shadow of hierarchy’, Scharpf 1997). In this paper, 
intergovernmental networks refer to such multi-level arrangements.  
The main strand in IGR-literature dealing with intergovernmental collaboration is 
intergovernmental management (IGM). IGM is defined as “the process of solving 
intergovernmental problems under conditions of high uncertainty and complexity 
through the creation and use of governmental and nongovernmental networks” 
(Wright and Krane 1998:1162). The increased importance adhered to IGR-networks 
instigates IGR-scholars to shift the focus of research to the behaviour of the 
individuals involved in these networks. While the functioning of such networks is 
bound by institutional (e.g. formal-legalistic) factors, these are actively managed 
                                                     
1 Policy networks are sets of horizontal relationships with a certain level of stability/endurance and structuring, between 
multiple and relatively autonomous actors faced with resource dependencies, involving processes of resource exchange 
through bargaining and negotiation, trying to achieve public purpose (Voets 2008:28). 
3 Methodological note: two single case studies referred to in this paper were carried out as part of a doctoral research 
project (Voets 2008). The case study data is based on a broad range of formal and informal documents and semi-structured 
interviews (27 interviews for case ‘Project Gentse Kanaalzone’ (PGK), period 10/2003-3/2004; 25 interviews for case 
‘Parkbos Gent’ (PBG), period 2/2007-6/2007).  
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or even created by network managers. As such, IGM requires analysis of 
institutional and behavioural activities. 
We assume that any innovative capacity of such networks is the outcome of a form 
of social engineering – broadly defined here as network management (Kickert, Klijn 
and Koppenjan 1997; Klijn and Teisman 1997). The question dealt with in this 
paper therefore is: How does network management (contribute to) innovative 
intergovernmental relations (IGR)? Network management is discussed in terms of 
network management strategies (section 1), network managers and their attributes 
(section 2), and management roles (section 3). The paper concludes with some 
critical reflections.  
This paper combines insights from intergovernmental relations literature and policy 
network studies. The different sections are illustrated with case study data of two 
Flemish IGR-networks (Voets 2008, case summaries in annex).3  
 
1. Management strategies at work 
Management of multi-actor settings differs from mono-organisational management, 
in terms of the context in which management activities take shape, strategies and 
instruments used, and capacities needed (see for instance Agranoff 2007; Agranoff 
and McGuire 2004; Mandell 1999; O’Toole and Meier 2004). 
Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) sum up a broad range of strategies that 
network managers can deploy. Table 1 presents the set of management strategies, 
but these are not discussed in detail. The strategies are organized in boxes based 
on the level they are directed at (game or network), and on the points of 
intervention (interactions or ideas). The strategies are expected to contribute to 
the quality of the policy processes (e.g. keeping the process going, improving 
discussions or the way in which decision-making or the interaction between 
participants is organised) and products (e.g. learning, changing discourses, planning 
documents and decisions, ‘physical’ achievements in the field) in and of the 
network. 
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Table 1: Strategies for network management 
 Game level Network level 
Strategies aimed at ideas/perceptions 
of actors 
Covenanting 
Influencing perceptions 
Bargaining 
Development of common language 
Prevention of/introduction of ideas 
Furtherance of reflection 
Reframing 
Changing formal policy 
 
Strategies aimed at the interaction 
between actors 
Selective (de-)activating 
Arranging  
Organizing confrontations 
Development of procedures 
Furtherance of facilitation, brokerage, 
mediation and arbitration 
Network (de-)activating 
Constitutional reform: changing rules 
and resources 
(de-)coupling games 
Changing incentives 
Changing internal structure and position 
of actors 
Changing relations 
Management by chaos 
(Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997:170) 
 
The first distinction is made between more operational management activities and 
more institutional management activities. The first level is the game level, in 
which the ‘game management’ is aimed at influencing the interaction processes 
between actors in a policy game4, in a context where those that are managing 
consider the network structure as a constant. The second level is the network 
level, in which management is aimed at changing or altering features of the 
network itself. This ‘network constitution’ refers to all activities that are aimed at 
sustained changes in the network itself, as they redefine rules and change the 
distribution of resources, hence the ‘meta-governance’ of the network (Klijn 1996). 
Network constitution strategies try to influence the context or the action arena in 
which games between actors are played, while management at the game level tries 
to influence the ongoing processes within and through the network institution.  
The second distinction is about whether management is aimed at substance or at 
process, namely trying to influence what becomes policy and ways to arrive at 
policy.  
                                                     
4 Policy games are strategic interaction processes taking shape around issues (Kickert, Klijn and koppenjan 1997). 
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The use and usefulness of these management strategies is context-dependent: “not 
all strategies are equally effective in every situation” (Kickert, Klijn and 
Koppenjan 1997:169).  
Voets (2008) showed that – not withstanding the fact that a number of strategies 
are defined too broadly or overlap - their scheme to analyse network management 
is helpful to study intergovernmental relations. The set of network management 
strategies of Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, developed as a generic set applicable to 
all kinds of policy networks, also provides a useful tool to map activities of network 
managers in a specific IGR-network context.  
The application in our study however also learned how strategies are combined, 
how the motivation behind the strategies should be mapped as well, and how the 
set of instruments might be expanded. We discuss these three elements in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
1.1. Combining strategies 
While strategies can be singled out (to some extent), they are very often combined 
in practice. These combinations can be deployed simultaneously or in a sequential 
mode.  
For instance, to influence perceptions of actors, the main network managers in 
both cases studied also organised confrontations. To feed the discussions, they 
introduced a number of ideas, using plans and graphics, but this was combined with 
bargaining about for instance the numbers of hectares per sector (e.g. how many 
hectares for economic purposes, for afforestation, for recreation, …). 
Sometimes parallel, sometimes in a later stage, arranging5 and constitutional 
reform6 are used as well. Constitutional reform for instance is used to achieve the 
network agenda, and network managers try to arrange a formal network structure. 
To do so, in each case, they also try to activate an actor to take up the formal 
leadership of the network.  
                                                     
5 Arranging essentially refers to creating, sustaining and changing ad hoc provisions which suit groups of interactions in a 
policy game (Klijn and Teisman 1997:110) 
6 A strategy aimed at changing the network conditions or the institutional context in which policy games are played. 
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These different strategies are not used or combined in a random or uncoordinated 
order; network managers actively organise and link these activities together. For 
instance, in developing a new organisational structure, they also try to use formal 
policy. In the PGK-case, the network managers among others lobbied successfully 
for new Flemish legislation allowing them to set up a formal advisory body for the 
focus area. In doing so, they also suggested a set of rules (e.g. composition, 
decision-making). In the PBG, network managers try to get the Flemish government 
to grant the network a formal status as a strategic project. Such a status also 
provides additional financial resources, and a way to activate the provincial 
governor to become the main network promoter.  
 
1.2. Overcoming instrumentalism  
The focus should not be put on the network management strategies only. 
Otherwise, the analysis risks to result in an overly managerial, technical, and 
instrumental view, perhaps typical for the Dutch network school. Our study reveals 
that the rationale behind instruments and techniques in most cases is inspired by 
‘political’ motives, and it is the combination of both that gives instruments their 
real ‘strategic’ meaning. For that reason, analysis of the network management 
strategies should be linked to the strategic goals behind the strategies. Otherwise, 
it becomes very difficult to distinguish between network management and the 
complete array of actions taken by network participants. As network management 
is “aimed at promoting joint problem solving or policy development” (Kickert and 
Koppenjan 1997:43), one needs to look at the concrete goals that network 
managers try to achieve when using a management strategy.  
In the cases studied, network management is at times administrative (e.g. practical 
organisation of meetings and reports), but seems highly political as they deal with 
redistributive and regulatory issues. As such, while many actions in both cases can 
be fit to the Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan typology, the motivation behind their use 
is important to map as well (and might lead to a different typology). Their typology 
maps the management strategies according to their ‘external’ logic, while the 
‘internal’ logic within the network and the logic of the network managers should be 
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the first step for an adequate understanding of the motives behind their use. 
Network management therefore should include a political perspective, which can 
also result in adding a number of strategies to the typology.  
An important, more political network management strategy, is for instance 
coalition building. In the PBG-case, the proponents of afforestation consciously 
built a coalition with other sectoral interests to isolate the farmers who were going 
to lose farmland to (be transformed into) woods. This coalition building was 
successful because the network managers linked different policy games, grounding 
their afforestation ambitions in a larger package deal which could not be opened 
up anymore in the final stage of decision-making at the Flemish level. In doing so, 
the network managers consciously kept the agricultural administration out of the 
network, and only allowed another administration suspected to serve farmers’ 
interests to play a secondary role.  
A second, parallel strategy used in the PBG-case was to create pressure to ensure 
that politicians would not halt the planning process at some point (for instance 
because of protest of farmers) by mobilising the general public through various 
forms of communication. The general public was activated not only to create 
pressure, but also in an attempt to change the perceptions of decision-makers 
about the need to create more woods. Part of this strategy included the activation 
of an NGO with a mission to create more woods in Flanders.  
By adding network management strategies like coalition-building and pressure 
creation, network management analysis becomes more considerate of the political 
dimension of and in networks, and of the political strategy inspiring the network 
managers. This could lead us to a more broad and less instrumental interpretation 
of management strategies, based upon an in-depth analysis of the rationales in the 
network itself.  
 
1.3. Covert action 
The focus on the actual goals of network management in the two cases also shows 
that many strategies are deployed covertly. Network managers face a dilemma. 
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They are expected to embody the collaborative spirit of the network and to 
manage in the interest of the network agenda as a whole (or at least to arrive at 
one to begin with). But to achieve success, some management activities required 
are manipulative, coercive, and rather sneaky (Huxham and Vangen 2005:66).  
There is a constant tension between manipulative behaviour which at times can be 
appropriate, versus the spirit of collaborative working. In the cases studied, actors 
for instance are activated and de-activated using coercive power (using political 
influence to order a governmental unit to leave or to join in). Some actors are not 
allowed full play by the network managers, other actors are kept out strategically. 
Some actors are activated only to avoid negative power play of another actor. 
Network managers in both cases strictly control the meeting agenda, not only in 
terms of process but also in terms of substance. As such, the management 
activities are only partially open and collaborative, part of it is not and remains 
backstage. To analyse this dark or covert side of network management, in-depth 
interviewing proves a crucial research method.  
 
2. Managers and their attributes: what determines innovative capacity? 
By studying management activities in a network, one can also discern who carries 
out such activities. As the focus is on intergovernmental networks, the particular 
interest is in the network management activities of public officials and the way 
those activities shape intergovernmental relations. This section focuses on the 
main managers, and a number of attributes that are typical for the 
intergovernmental network managers in the cases studied. These attributes seem 
to be conditions for innovation. 
 
2.1. Managers: who is who? 
Typically in networks, there is no single manager (Agranoff 2007). Network 
management activities are deployed by both public and private actors: 
executive/legislative politicians, civil servants from agencies/departments, 
technocrats/generalists, private actors, or a mix of such actors (Huxham and 
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Vangen 2005; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan 1997). Management often is the result 
of these joined efforts. ‘Joined’ then does not necessarily mean that this is the 
result of deliberate or rationally inspired cooperation. It can also be the product of 
loosely coupled activities of managers acting individually at different levels and at 
different positions in the network.  
In the cases studied, network management is the work of informal network teams 
joining local, provincial and Flemish governmental actors. Excepting the project 
coordinator in the first network (explicitly hired to manage the operational side of 
the network) and the consultants, in both networks the main network managers are 
self-appointed. Informal network teams (i.e. two ‘network cores’) set up the 
network in the early rounds, controlling (most of) network management throughout 
the process. The policy impact of the network management team is therefore 
substantial (but certainly not exclusive). As they lack an official or formal 
leadership or management position, their potential for network management is 
directly dependent on the degree of acceptance of their activities by the other 
actors.  
These teams, whose members coordinate their strategies and play different roles 
(see below) produce intergovernmental cocktails. Some are mainly network 
champions (‘the spiders in the intergovernmental web’); others take up a network 
promoting role, or provide creative input. The intergovernmental cocktails consist 
of ingredients derived from different governmental tiers, policy sectors, policy 
instruments, and are drawn from the political and administrative realm (including 
political parties). As such, a generic capacity to function in networks is required by 
all network managers, but they can have different specialized skills to do so.  
In both case studies, administrative officials (e.g. project coordinator, the head of 
the provincial environmental administration, the provincial governor) are at the 
heart of the network management. Their actions represent the bulk of network 
management. Consultants (mainly in terms of know-how and expertise) and 
politicians (to ensure that political decisions are acquired) seem to take up a more 
supportive role. The central position of administrative officials however should be 
read with caution; this might be attributed to the fact that their actions are less 
covert than for instance those of politicians or private interests. So while the role 
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of administrative officials in network management is stressed here, the politicians 
should not be discarded or degraded to a secondary role.  
The prominent position of administrative officials however can create conflicts 
with politicians that feel threatened in their position, and in their ability to 
present themselves. Some actors also feel that the main network managers 
sometimes deploy activities considered as political and unfit for civil servants. 
Some politicians feel that such strategic planning processes take away their 
autonomy to make political deals. They call for the ‘primacy of politics’ to take ad 
hoc decisions as they see fit, without linking them to collaborative networks. Such 
politicians are very weary of engaging in long term and multi-actor policy 
processes, because it ties their hands to act ad hoc, to serve their clients; it 
hampers their freedom to wheal and deal, to make party political package deals. 
While politicians with this ratio are found at all levels, it seems that this is a key 
feature at the level of the Flemish ministerial cabinets7 – precisely where the main 
resources needed by both networks are situated.  
 
2.2. Managerial attributes 
The study of managerial behaviour reveals some basic attributes or personal skills 
which seem to be crucial for effective management of complex processes in IGR-
settings. Those attributes are essential conditions for innovation. We organise our 
findings into three topics: passion and determination, skills and capacities, and 
finally (and maybe most importantly) the capability to act and behave in the grey 
zone of the boundaries between autonomous governmental units. ‘Working at the 
boundaries’ could be another definition of network management, and such 
boundary management is probably one of the most fertile soils for innovation.  
 
                                                     
7 In Belgium, federal and regional ministers have personal staff called ‘cabinets’ at their disposal. These cabinets consist of 
political staff members and policy experts regarding the ministers’ competences (up to 50 people or more). Staff members 
are often associated with the same political party as the minister. Frequently, civil servants are attached to a cabinet for a 
period of office. On a smaller scale, such cabinets also exist in cities. 
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Passion and determination 
The ownership of the main intergovernmental boundary spanners8 is linked to 
mission-driven endeavours (Agranoff 2005:19). The network managers in both cases 
are genuinely convinced about the necessity and the way to achieve the network 
agenda. As such, their network management activities are not just a matter of 
professionalism, but also fuelled by personal beliefs. In the cases studied, they are 
(mainly) men with a mission. It also requires a high level of resilience, and 
patience: achieving both network agendas takes many years. 
Interestingly, the passion and determination in both networks is also fuelled by the 
roots of the actors involved. Politicians in Flanders are known to have a special 
interest for their locality and serving local interest at the central level (‘political 
localism’). However, civil servants at provincial and Flemish level are also driven 
by a local (in both cases ‘Ghent’) reflex, which might be labelled administrative 
localism. As such, network managers in an intergovernmental context can also be 
motivated by the ability to do something for ‘their’ locality.  
 
Skills and capacities 
Being passionate about the network and determined to achieve success is not 
sufficient; the right combination of skills and capacities is needed to create the 
required intergovernmental policy mix. Intergovernmental collaboration demands 
actors that can tolerate but also use high levels of complexity and uncertainty in 
function of the network agenda.  
 
Intergovernmental network managers seem able to navigate through the pea-soup 
that the amalgamation of policies, interests, actors, relations, tiers, and 
contingencies is for an outsider (and for some insiders). As Thoenig (2005) argued, 
a highly fragmented public space with many tiers and actors induces governmental 
                                                     
8 Paraphrasing Sullivan and Skelcher (2002:100), intergovernmental boundary spanners are individuals who exhibit the 
necessary combination of skills and attributes for intergovernmental collaboration. From their formal position in the arena, 
they develop political and bureaucratic strategies to link governmental actors across the horizontal, vertical, 
intragovernmental, and politico-administrative divide, and link up with relevant private stakeholders.    
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competition, but provides excellent opportunities for actors that can deal with 
such complexity.  
They are not network super heroes with special powers, but they combine their 
institutional positions and a drive to achieve success with personal skills. 
Paraphrasing one of the interviewees, these actors play in the intergovernmental 
champions’ league. Weberian bureaucrats for instance are not able to play in that 
league. They are too dependent on features of a rational governing system, while 
networks demand the capacity to match rational and political views on policy-
making. The challenge for network managers is to match long term perspectives 
with private interests and politicians who are often more concerned with 
immediate action and short term results.  
For network managers, there is also an element what might be called ‘the fun 
factor’. The network managers in both cases simply love dealing with high levels of 
complexity and uncertainty; they get a kick out of trying to accomplish successful 
intergovernmental coordination, and they consider the networks as a personal 
learning environment. So while network managers require a particular set of skills 
and capacities, they also learn by doing. 
 
Scanning and spanning boundaries 
To manage networks successfully, actors have to scan and span boundaries of 
governmental tiers, politics and administration, public and private sector, different 
policy sectors, … In this respect, the way network management is at the crossroads 
of politics and administration proves to be of particular interest in the cases 
studied.  
In both cases studied, the administrative officials as key managers not just 
implement policies, they actively co-produce policy and strategies to achieve 
them, including strategies towards political actors and the use of party political 
channels. Instead of politicians setting out the strategic policy objectives and 
putting administrative officials to work to implement them, the praxis is even more 
the other way around. Administrative officials develop strategic policy objectives, 
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and try to pull the strings of competent politicians to get the required decisions 
and resources. The strategy of administrative officials to ‘employ’ political officials 
is said to be relatively successful. A number of politicians have no problem with the 
proactive behaviour of administrative officials, and adhere to the strategic 
planning processes as developed in the networks. They form alliances with civil 
servants to achieve certain policy outcomes. They also believe in the value of the 
way both networks forward a long term vision and action programme for the focus 
areas. 
Both networks studied try to develop a policy focused on the locality, but are also 
concerned with acquiring resources, often located outside the network. To do so, 
the network managers create and use professional, personal, and party political 
contacts. They also indicate that this is the only way to achieve success; limiting 
themselves to a traditional bureaucratic role is not an option. According to the 
network managers, the governmental praxis in Flanders (i.e. a very crowded 
institutional and highly politicized, partytocratic, clientelist arena, imbued with 
political localism) demands administrative officials to take up a more active and 
‘political’ role if they are to achieve results.  
By trial and error, a number of administrative officials develop strategic insights 
about political power and the necessity to use it to implement ‘their’ networks and 
‘their’ (prize-winning) planning processes. Administrative officials are confronted 
with politics, as stakes of issues are high, resources scarce, and politicians 
ultimately have decision-making power. The administrative officials learned that 
they needed politics to avoid the network of hollowing out or reducing ‘their’ 
policy to a virtual one. The administrative officials learned the need to match their 
policy ambitions with the political game. 
In doing so, the network managers developed a set of antennas that are ‘politically 
sensitive’ and are aware of the risk that politicians might feel surpassed. Generally 
speaking, they are able to scan the boundaries between the political and 
administrative realm and have been very prudent in spanning both. The network 
managers do not discard or bypass the political processes/politicians in policy 
processes; they actively deal with it and also team up with political officials to get 
decisions. Such collaboration between civil servants and politicians cuts across 
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intergovernmental and sectoral divides. In the PGK, for instance, a local alderman 
competent for urban planning teams up with a provincial civil servant of an 
environmental administration, the provincial governor, and a Flemish cabinet 
member competent for port affairs.  
The direct participation of local and provincial politicians in the networks ensures 
that politicians can also put their eggs in the network baskets. However, if one 
moves up to the Flemish ladder, the lack of political interest and involvement 
makes the Flemish side a mainly administrative role. As a result, local and 
provincial public officials need to team up – often in coalition with Flemish 
administrative officials - to acquire access to the political realm at the level of the 
Flemish government. 
In the PGK, administrative officials focus increasingly on politics as the networks 
progress. This is also the result of their experiences in the early rounds. In the 
early rounds, paraphrasing Flyvbjerg (1998:160), the administrative officials to a 
certain extent tried to eliminate politics through a rational process of strategic 
planning. In the PBG, learning by actors who were also involved in the first 
network, in combination with the salience and redistributive character of issues, 
however led to a more permanent political focus.  
It is important to note that the distinction between politicians and civil servants in 
Flanders is at times diffuse. A number of experienced administrative officials 
involved in both networks for instance also worked on ministerial cabinets. They 
claim that close interactions with politicians are a necessity. As temporary cabinet 
members, civil servants for instance organise political interactions to arrive at 
certain decisions. In this respect, the network managers themselves can have an 
ambiguous position, but such mobility between both realms can also provide them 
with a stronger capacity to scan and span boundaries.  
In the Flemish context, the provincial governor has such a potential ‘scan and span’ 
capacity, as he is a former politician appointed as a civil servant, located at the 
crossroads of all governmental tiers. In the PGK, the governor acts as an important 
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interface between the political and administrative realm at different governmental 
tiers. He is an active social-democrat, but his institutional position is in the 
administrative realm. He proves to be the main intergovernmental connector 
between both realms at different tiers. In the PBG-case, the main network 
managers hope to bring in the provincial governor for similar purposes.  
In both networks, it is clear that the intergovernmental and multi-sectoral nature 
of the networks demand a broad array of formal and informal contacts between 
politicians and administrative officials. The informal position of both networks also 
warrants an ad hoc way of interactions between both. In the end however, 
politicians decide whether or not to push policy buttons and in what direction (e.g. 
in deciding the allocation of the budget). As such, while the more visible (or 
apparently high level of) activity of administrative officials in managing the 
network might lead to the neglect of the role of politicians, the activities of the 
latter have to be taken into account as well.     
Hence, while there is much intergovernmental boundary scanning and spanning 
going on, such activities do not change the boundaries of the state; they change 
the boundaries within the state. The networks become a world of their own within 
the government system: they join actors in a project- and area-based logic, which 
gradually – alternating between periods of rapid development, slow progress or 
even decline – becomes a system with a proper agenda, a distinctive culture and 
ways to meet and interactions, debating methods, and the like. In that ‘virtual’ 
world - which is heavily linked to the ‘real’ world outside the network – a dynamic 
is created that provokes intergovernmental boundary spanning. 
 
 
3. Innovative management roles 
Based on the analysis of management activities and managers in the networks and 
inspired by earlier work of Agranoff (2003), a fivefold role typology is forwarded at 
this point. It seems that the main network managers each have their 
‘specialisation’ in terms of strategies used. Innovative behaviour at the different 
levels of the networks is related to these different management roles: innovation 
at the more administrative or operational level, at the level of concepts, the level 
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of strategy or methods,… Planning consultants for instance are most active in 
strategies that try to influence ideas and perceptions (e.g. developing a common 
language, framing and reframing perceptions of actors, organising confrontations, 
and covenanting). Some administrative officials focus dominantly on shaping the 
interactions or relations between actors.  
Five distinct roles can be discerned: network operator, network champion, network 
promoter (or ‘tractor actor’), creative thinker, and vision keeper. These roles are 
now developed in more detail.  
 
3.1. Network operator 
A ‘network operator’ is a person - e.g. a project manager - that is responsible for 
the daily management of the network: preparing documents for meetings, 
following up on the operations of different working groups, managing the website 
and databases. He/she functions as a secretariat taking care of all the 
administrative aspects of the arrangement, and takes care of the day-to-day 
management. However, the network operator is not limited to administrative 
functions only; he is for instance also the main contact for and communicator 
between actors in- and outside the arrangement.  
At first sight, the network operator is not an innovative role, and very similar to a 
traditional administrator’s role. The innovative capacity however is that such an 
administration of intergovernmental networks does not likely to exist otherwise. In 
traditional IGR, administrators are located in their proper governmental tier, 
controlling or negotiating with others, but not managing the relations from a 
collective, network perspective. The latter also requires different skills: the ability 
to understand the substance of the process, to tune and navigate between 
different actors’ agenda’s and policy cycle stages of different governmental tiers. 
As such, they have to try to maintain a workable overlay, within the constraints set 
by the formal institutional make-up.  
In the PGK-case, there is a full time network operator at work. Interestingly, the 
operator is a former representative of one of the actors. His track record (having 
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served in different positions in- and outside government) also enabled him to join 
the attributes discussed in the previous section, like for instance linking different 
policy cycles to one another and forwarding precise timings for policy products and 
decisions required. In the PBG-case, this function was not a formal one. Over time, 
several actors took up this role on a more informal basis.  
 
3.2. Network champion  
Similar to Agranoff’s (2003) notion, a ‘network champion’ is understood here as an 
actor that excels in networking in terms of building, maintaining and using 
connections with other actors at all levels and of all backgrounds. A ‘network 
champion’ excels in networking at personal, professional and party political levels; 
he/she is the spider in the arrangements’ web. The collaborative network 
champion has a heart for the network agenda (as opposed to other highly 
networked actors that only strive for an individual agenda). To be called a network 
champion in relation to network management, the networking needs to be focused 
primarily on achieving network goals. 
The innovative capacity of the network champion lies in networking capabilities 
across tiers, sectors, and the politico-administrative divide. Without much formal 
resources to do so, the creation of a network arena (that however also might be 
institutionalised in or based on formal relations) provides an intergovernmental 
coordination potential in its own right, in terms of relations. Compared to 
traditional IGR, the formal-legalistic relations are explicitly combined with social 
relations in function of a joint agenda.  
In the case studies, the main network champion is the same person. By joining 
personal, professional and party political levels, politically backed by the provincial 
governor, he was not only able to figure out the desired intergovernmental 
configuration, but also to actively link actors together.  
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3.3. Network promoter (or ‘tractor actor’) 
Somewhat diverging from Agranoff’s (2003) definition, a ‘network promoter’ is 
defined here as an actor that is considered authoritative, accepted by all actors as 
a principal (in moral terms, not in terms of power or hierarchy) which leads the 
participating actors towards the common goals. He holds a position of trust and is 
also the one to which actors’ direct grievances or concerns. He tries to keep things 
together at a general level and is the one that is expected to appease conflicts. If 
necessary, this actor might even ‘sanction’ network members (but again, based on 
a moral authority, based on trust and informal acceptance, granted to him by the 
stakeholders, rather than based on a hierarchic position). He is the active chair of 
the network, accepted by most/all actors as authoritative, perceived neutral, 
capable of keeping the process on route. In an intergovernmental network, he is 
also a go-between for local, provincial and Flemish government. As such, he 
promotes the network intergovernmentally.  
While network champions create the necessary linkages between governmental 
tiers, sectors, and politics and administration, and network operators use this set 
to organise the networks’ operations, the added value of the network promoter is 
to carry the weight of the network. The network promoter is able to overcome the 
different cultures and attitudes present in governmental and policy silos, and keep 
the representatives in a workable mode. He is able to capture the conflict between 
governmental actors, acting as a guardian of the intergovernmental catchment 
area or border region that any intergovernmental network presents. In this respect, 
he helps to innovate IGR by introducing a (new kind of) intergovernmental 
leadership respecting the equality of levels, mainly based on informal and personal 
characteristics.  
In the PGK-case, the provincial governor lead the project and its operations 
without having much hierarchical power or formal competences to do so (although 
his institutional position puts him at the crossroads of local, provincial, and central 
government). He has a substantial moral weight, great moral authority. The 
governor is considered to lack a clearly identifiable interest and is therefore in a 
privileged position to do so. In the formal moments of the network, like meetings 
of the steering committee, he chairs meetings based on notes and support of the 
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project office, consultants, and provincial department head. The latter does much 
of the groundwork for meetings but is very active in terms of organising the 
resources and rules, and the constitutional reform of the network. He manages in 
tandem with the governor. Backstage, the governor is said to be engaged actively 
in playing party political channels to achieve results. In the PBG-case, the main 
flaw identified by the network managers is precisely the lack of such a network 
promoter who can ‘control’ the inner arena of the network and promote the 
network in the outer arena.  
 
3.4. Creative thinker 
A ‘creative thinker’ is an actor that has no stake in the focus area or regarding the 
issues at the table, and hence is ‘free’ to give creative input. These actors deliver 
impeachable expertise, develop concepts, models, and plans, visualise ideas, 
produce tools and the like to build ‘groupware’10, to induce consensus, and the 
like. They actively try to frame and reframe actors’ mindsets, to forward 
innovative and joint concepts to incorporate different interests, and the like. The 
creative thinker however can also play a role on the level of interactions, and take 
up a ‘network coaching’-role for instance in terms of quick wins, or identifying 
strengths and weaknesses of actors.  
The creative thinkers are actors that help to innovate IGR in terms of ideas and 
interactions, for instance by proposing new tools, instruments, structures, 
resources, etc. The decision to bring in those creative thinkers itself is already a 
moment of innovation, while they in turn can activate the innovative potential of 
the IGR-network (in terms of both substance and process, at game and network 
level).  
As the cases are focused strongly on issues of spatial planning, planning consultants 
are the main ‘creative thinker’. They intervened for instance by presenting new 
ways of looking at problems and at the area at stake. The introduced new spatial 
                                                     
10 Groupware is “group development that reaches mutual understanding and transcends hierarchy-based 
communication/interaction that allows multiple cultures, procedures, and divisions of labor to come together” (Agranoff 
2007:213). 
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concepts of thinking and looking, and thereby influenced ideas and interactions, at 
game and network level.  
Interestingly, they are also able to present intergovernmental linkages, especially 
in terms of substance, because they carry out studies and projects for many actors 
involved in the network at different tiers (e.g. the city of Ghent, Flemish planning 
administration). As a result, they can create substantive links between plans or 
documents, but also have some power to link different policy processes more 
strongly. They furthermore suggested ways to jointly manage the focus areas, ways 
to finance the network agenda, or what should be put into legislation. As such, 
they present an additional governmental capacity that is otherwise not deployed 
(or not in the same way) for intergovernmental relations. 
 
3.5. Vision keeper 
Apart from these four roles, which can be joined in single actors but are more 
likely brought together in an informal or formal network management team, a fifth 
role can be defined. Similar to Agranoff’s (2003) notion, a ‘vision keeper’ is an 
actor in- or outside the network that - for whatever reason – is/becomes a strong 
‘believer’ in the networks added value. These actors are concerned with the 
progress of the collective, rather than looking only at their direct organisational 
interest. If these actors feel that the network tends to go in a different direction 
than the joint agenda set out, they will act (or at least communicate this to the 
other network managers). These actors are also activated by the main network 
managers if their assistance is needed. This separates them from stakeholders or 
network participants who have a more narrow approach to the network and only 
focus on what they perceive to be their own direct organisational goals.  
These vision keepers can be public officials, but non-public actors can take up this 
role as well. In intergovernmental terms, their innovative capacity is to transcend 
the tendency to focus on a single organisation, sector, or tier, without necessarily 
being part of the network and/or taking up a very active part in the network 
management. The vision keepers also act as sounding boards for network managers 
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playing other roles. While network champions, network operators, network 
promoter, or creative thinkers might loose sight of the bigger picture because of 
their time-consuming management activities or run the risk of going ahead without 
reflecting on their actions, the vision keeper helps to ensure reflexivity.  
In the cases studied, vision keepers are actors that were mostly heavily involved in 
early rounds, but who switched positions or are no longer at the core of the 
network management. As such, in both networks a number of actors shifted from 
one role to another as the networks progressed. 
These five roles can be combined in single persons, but analysing their network 
strategies show that actors are often ‘specialised’ in one of them (without 
necessarily being appointed to do so, or being perceived as such). The presence 
and successful combination of these roles contributes to intergovernmental 
capacity-building, offering better prospect to achieve coordination and overcome 
governmental fragmentation (Agranoff 2008:11).  
 
Conclusions  
The previous section have shown how network management helps to innovate 
intergovernmental relations, who is managing to do so, what main attributes they 
have/require, and that different roles can be discerned. The focus was put strongly 
on the behavioural activities of individuals in concrete networks. In doing so, the 
paper might have created a picture of ‘network super heroes’, a small set of 
mainly public actors that shape intergovernmental interactions in networks as they 
see fit. It is however clear that this is not the case, as they have to manage in a 
rigid, and diffuse institutional landscape, featuring a high number of contingencies. 
The potential for network management to innovate IGR is dependent on a wide 
range of structural or institutional variables, too broad to be dealt with in this 
paper.  
The potential of network management to innovate intergovernmental relations is 
nevertheless clear. It helps to make IGR multilateral, collaborative and to combine 
a wide range of policy issues (as opposed to bilateral intergovernmental 
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transactions between governments). Network management offers a better prospect 
to achieve coordination and overcome governmental fragmentation, and stimulates 
more collaborative than competitive intergovernmental relations. It also 
contributes to intergovernmental capacity-building. Through network management, 
an arena to ‘capture’ conflict between governmental actors can be created 
(Agranoff 2008:11; Loughlin 2007). Finally, paraphrasing Loughlin (2007:393), it 
helps to achieve informal political and administrative decentralization. The 
informal political decentralization implies that the IGR-networks take up a policy 
role without formal powers to do so. The administrative decentralization refers to 
the fact that IGR-networks join a range of administrations that are expected to 
incorporate the network operations in their day-to-day praxis.  
We used the two-level framework of Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) to start 
our analysis, and suggested some important amendments to their approach by 
putting network management strategies in a more political perspective. In doing 
so, these strategies get their real, network-bound, and internal meaning and 
effects. We consider this as a necessity for the study of IGR-networks: management 
of networks is also about power, coalition building, bargaining, making 
compromises, playing with concepts and the strategic input of experts.  
A main conclusion is that this kind of innovative ‘political’ behaviour makes up the 
core of the roles of public officials as managers of the two IGR-networks studied. 
This innovation can be developed in the boundary zone between autonomous 
governments taking part in networks. Put differently: the existence of the grey 
zone of boundary spanning and boundary scanning stimulates innovation.  
Innovation then is related to the features of boundary work: the capacities of and 
for motivated network managers who can think and act strategically flourish when 
and where roles are mixed up, where actors develop in a new setting, and when 
perceptions, goals and strategies of actors meet. It is this mix of institutional and 
personal features that increases the possibilities to introduce innovation in 
intergovernmental networks.  
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Annex: case ‘Project Gentse Kanaalzone’ (PGK)  
PGK is an ongoing strategic planning process (started in 1993) in the Flemish part of 
the area surrounding the canal Ghent-Terneuzen. The issues are complex: intense 
economic activities in the maritime-industrial canal area are joined by considerable 
environmental nuisance. Historically, a number of residential areas are present in 
the area. The parallel and uncoordinated development of housing and economic 
activities resulted in an entanglement of both, leading to increased pressure on the 
area.  
The main objective of PGK is to reconcile both functions through an integrated 
approach with participation of the relevant actors in the focus area. The PGK wants 
to improve the environmental qualities and increase economic development 
prospects by reducing pollution of soil, water and air, by increasing the quality of 
living by infrastructural interventions (e.g. developing buffer zones between 
housing and industry), linking residential areas, intervening in the flows of traffic in 
the area (decoupling residential and economic traffic), expropriating housing in 
unliveable areas, by developing and reorganising water-, road-, and railways, and 
relocating companies. Such a development should be coordinated through a joint 
vision on the future development of the canal area. 
Main network members are three local governments, provincial government, 
dozens of governmental units of Flemish government, Dutch governments, citizen 
groups, companies, interest groups, consultants, and political parties. 
Policy sectors involved are economy, spatial planning, public infrastructure (roads 
and water), and the environment.  
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Annex: case ‘Parkbos Gent’ (PBG) 
PBG is an ongoing policy process (started in 1996) to develop a multifunctional park 
in the south of the urban region of Ghent. The issues and ambitions in the focus 
area are complex; it is an open landscape, pressured by the urbanisation in the 
greater Ghent region. There are different claims (heritage, science park, 
agriculture, recreation, housing, nature, …), and these claims need to be matched 
with the ambition of a number of actors to achieve a substantial afforestation in 
the focus area (250 to 300 hectares as part of Flemish policy). 
The network focused much of its energy in developing and implementing a legal 
spatial plan that could accommodate different interests, without diverging from 
the goal of a number of actors of a substantial afforestation. 
Main network members are three local governments, provincial government, 
dozens of governmental units of Flemish government, interest groups, and 
consultants. 
Policy sectors involved are economy, spatial planning, agriculture, recreation, and 
the environment.  
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